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ABSTRACT
Although contemporary technology adoption theories incorporate societal norms or peer
references, it is unclear to what extent these factors influence choices. In this research, we apply
institutional theory and the concept of mimetic isomorphism as peer influences to the technology
evaluation process to determine the degree to which managers conform when selecting between
competing information technologies. More specifically, we test if peer influence is sufficient to
overcome a product evaluation where the choice is believed to be inferior. An experiment is
conducted using the World Wide Web and a national sample of 348 senior information technology
and business decision makers. Significant effects are found where inferior technologies are selected
if respondents are informed that competitors have selected them. Further research is warranted to
investigate the presence and extent of these effects but overall implications are that product
evaluations may be more ornamental than substantive.
Keywords: Institutional theory, mimetic isomorphism, technology selection, technology evaluation
I.

INTRODUCTION

Technology adoption has received considerable attention from the IT community and academic
researchers but relatively little theory and few methodologies have been developed to explain the
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industrial technology selection decisions of early adopters, despite the fact that information technology
is vital to competitive advantage [McRary 1995] and accounts, on average, for more than a third of
all business spending [Bakos 1998]. The decision to invest in new technology—to acquire and apply
new technical knowledge and capabilities—is among the most important competitive decisions that
managers must make [Clark 1987].
Making a selection between competing technologies is a difficult and uncertain managerial choice
[Powell 1992]. Many of the modern complex technologies that underlie several of the systems and
services in common use today result from bitter and acrimonious standards battles [Shapiro and
Varian 1999] and selecting technologies that fail to achieve market acceptance can result in a costly
conversion effort, a reliance on stranded or obsolete technologies, and reduced competitive
advantage.
Evaluating any investment can be difficult but technology decisions have been found to be
different from other strategic investments and particularly troublesome because of the high risk and
stochastic nature of technology evolution [Choi 1994], the rising switching costs of many technologies
[Beggs 1989], and the presence of network effects and increasing returns for many technologies that
increase rather than decrease the utility of subsequent adoptions [Arthur 1987].
With the exception of overall selection matrices and product evaluation criteria, which practitioners have been found to generally ignore [Riddle and Williams 1987], research has found that
many firms have not formalized the technology acquisition processes [Durrani et al. 1998, 1999].
This lacuna may result from the relatively pedestrian nature of this task. Griffith and Zammuto
[1999], for example, find that the design of information and technology solutions are considered
challenging and creative, while other phases are considered “unsexy afterthoughts” and “secondclass jobs that ‘fit-in’ with the rest of the process” even though evaluation and acquisition are
prerequisite activities.
The purpose of this paper is to improve the understanding of early adopter technology selection
decisions by applying institutional theory to decision and cognitive models. Institutional theory is an
applicable and appropriate theoretical perspective for technology evaluation and selection because
it explicitly addresses uncertainty and ambiguity, characteristics that are salient during selection and
evaluation, and its application has been suggested to reduce contradictions and to improve the quality
of information systems theory development [Robey and Boudreau 1999]. In contrast to existing
decision models which have tended to emphasize the internal subjective norms of subordinates and
superiors, neoclassic institutional theory emphasizes the importance of external influences and
provides a mechanism, mimetic isomorphism, for firms to reduce decision ambiguity and uncertainty
by copying the decision choices made by others [DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan
1977].
In this research, we argue that the technology selection process is highly ambiguous for early
adopting firms. Selecting between competing but similar technologies before the market has signaled
or dictated a winner is a difficult, high-risk, and expensive (if wrong) decision that is nevertheless
necessary for many firms. Early evaluation is fraught with high uncertainty because choosing
technologies that do not survive in the marketplace is expensive in terms of both money and time,
can affect a firm’s competitive premise and economic viability, and can have industrial and societal
implications with respect to other innovations that may be crowded out [Rogers 1995]. To reduce this
uncertainty, we posit that institutionalism, through a process of mimetic isomorphism, affects the
technology selection decision process for early adopters such that the decisions made by referent
organizations are more salient for decision makers and they replicate the selection decisions of other
firms even if they believe the copied choices to be inferior or suboptimal.
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In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber argued that competition was the
most important force for businesses and that the rationalist order had become imprisoned in an “iron
cage” of competition and bureaucracy. However, building upon the work of DiMaggio and Powell
[1983],we argue that this is no longer the case during technology selection and that technology
decisions are not necessarily made for competitive differentiation but may transcend rational
competitive or individual evaluation by mimicry. We summarize and outline the evaluation and
acquisition literatures, briefly review adoption models and increasing returns, institutional theory, and
uncertainty avoidance. We develop a conceptual model that relates constructs of uncertainty
avoidance and innovation to mimetic isomorphism of technology selection, present the results of an
initial experimental test of our hypotheses, and discuss findings and opportunities for future research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION AND ACQUISITION
Technology investment has been found to be more difficult than other decisions because the costs
and benefits are hard to identify and quantify, and the intangible factors are significant [Powell 1992].
This has been supported by Dixit and Pindyck [1994], who found that emergent information technologies require substantial commitment because of the rising levels of switching costs, and by Peet
[1998], who suggested that the extreme uncertainty of technology selection has resulted in increased
analytical and financial rigor by practitioners.
Despite these difficulties, with the exception of relatively simple overall selection matrices
consisting of two dimensional weighted criteria, many firms have not formalized the technology
acquisition or evaluation process [Durrani et al. 1998, 1999], and research has generated little theory
and few methodologies as to how information technology acquisition decisions are made [Griffith and
Zammuto 1999].
In teams that use a mixture of subjective and quantitative measures to complete information
technology (IT) acquisition, Powell [1992] found that the lead or most influential member had a
disproportionate role in influencing the other members of the group. Industrial purchasing decisions
consist of rational and emotional economic elements [Kelly and Coaker 1976] and include both
technical and political factors [Riddle and Williams 1987]. However, quantitative evaluative analysis
is considered more procedural and ornamental than effective in that practitioners have been found
to either ignore the process or conduct one-off ad hoc evaluations [Riddle and Williams 1987],
particularly at the infrastructure level [De Jong 2000].
GENERAL THEORIES OF COGNITIVE ACTION
In this research, we investigate managerial identification and selection between competing
choices and use decision or cognitive models as our underlying framework. While the decisions
themselves are implemented at the level of the firm, individual decision and adoption models are
appropriate in this research for three reasons.
(1) The lead or most influential person has been found to have a disproportionate role in decision
making [Kelly and Coaker 1976].
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(2) Selection decisions can have considerable negative consequences if they are subsequently
determined to be suboptimal, particularly for the decision maker [Shapiro and Varian 1999].
(3) Mixed level methodologies are appropriate if the phenomena under evaluation have both micro
and macro implications [Markus and Robey 1988].
Although other models exist, because a great deal of the information systems research has been
based on the theory of reasoned action (TRA), we use TRA as a starting point in our research. TRA,
which originated from social psychology [Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Taylor and Todd 1995], is a very
broad model that can be applied to a wide cross-section of human behavior [Davis et al. 1989] and
posits that attitude (A) and subjective norms (SN) determine behavior intention (BI) to perform an
actual behavior.
The technology acceptance model (TAM) [Davis 1986] adapts TRA specifically to model user
acceptance of information systems. A key purpose of TAM is to trace the impact of external factors
on internal beliefs, attitudes, and intentions and, as such, TAM is aimed primarily at end-user
acceptance based upon ease of use and usefulness rather than the selection or acquisition decisions.
TAM is relevant however in that acquisition precedes usage (cf. Fichman and Kemerer 1999) and
is, therefore, a salient criteria for managers.
The theory of planned behavior [Ajzen 1985] is an extension to the TRA dealing with the
behavioral limitations over which people have limited volitional control and providing greater specificity
in both prediction and explanation [Ajzen 1991]. According to the theory, performance of a particular
behavior is a function of intentions and perceived behavioral control that includes the construct of selfefficacy. The explicit inclusion of subjective norms makes this a useful model for information systems
in areas where social effects (i.e. , pressure toward compliance or homogeneity) that are not directly
linked to job-related outcomes could cause unique variance [Mathieson 1991]. The decomposed
theory of planned behavior (DTPB) expands the TPB by including constructs from the diffusions of
innovation (DOI) perspective and more explicitly expanding subjective norms to superior, peer, and
subordinate influences, although these are predominantly internally focused. These inclusions provide many of the advantages of TAM by recognizing that normative beliefs are not monolithic but
result in a more complex and less parsimonious model [Taylor and Todd 1995].
The diffusion of innovation perspective is a much-studied area for both consumer and industrial
marketing and dates from the Ryan and Gross study of hybrid corn in Iowa [Rogers 1995]. More
recently, DOI’s five-stage model (attention, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption) has been variously
adapted and modified by others to include initiation, adoption, adaptation, acceptance, routinization,
and infusion [Agarwal 1999]. Although DOI research has been criticized as lacking a theoretical
foundation and consistently defined and discriminant constructs to provide requisite validity and
reliability [Moore and Benbasat 1991], DOI contributes to this work with its description of innovativeness as the degree to which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting
new ideas than other members of a social system, and segmentation of the bell-shaped adoption
curve into adoption groups (or the S-shaped curve when plotted on a cumulative basis).
We posit that although subjective norms, the influence of social pressure or normative beliefs to
perform or not perform a certain behavior, are known to be salient in technology related decisions
[Moore and Benbasat 1991], the predictive or explanatory power of adoption models would be
increased if they were more broadly and externally defined, rather than their existing characterization
as internal or within a manager’s direct operating environment or purview. We propose to address
this deficiency by incorporating institutional theory into a technology selection model and explicitly
including less visible or latent external influences and describing an influence process.
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INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Institutional theory arose in Germany during the late nineteenth century as a by-product of the
debate over the scientific method. Arguing that man was not a “lightning calculator of pleasures or
pains,” early institutional economists such as Thorstein Veblen, John Common, and Westley Mitchell
challenged the idea that economics could be reduced to a set of universal laws and unrealistic
assumptions and that, rather than atomistic behavior, conduct or behavior was affected by a person’s
habitual relations to others and their institutions [Scott 1995].
Undergoing a revitalization and renaissance in the 1970s as a reaction to the excesses of the
behavioral revolution, institutional theory sought to reestablish the importance of normative
frameworks and rule systems in guiding, constraining, and empowering behavior and departed from
those of the mainstream neoclassicists in four ways:
•

Indeterminacy versus determinacy: Where the orthodox model assumed perfect competition and
unique equilibria, institutionalists pointed to pervasive market power and indeterminacy, even
under competition.

•

Endogenous versus exogenous determination of preferences: Neoclassical theorists posited
individual preferences or wants whereas institutionalists argued that such preferences were
shaped by social institutions and that their operation should be the subject of economic analysis.

•

Behavioral realism versus simplifying assumptions: Institutional theorists argued that economists
should use more pragmatic and psychologically realistic models of economic motivation rather
than naive utilitarian assumptions.

•

Diachronic versus synchronic analysis: Rather than the timeless and placeless assumptions of
neoclassical theorists, institutionalists argued that economists should ascertain how the economy
acquired its features and conditions that cause time and place variance.

The reemergence of sociological institutionalism, which differs from institutional economics by
focusing on issues of legitimacy and constraint caused by structures rather than issues of transaction
costs and market hierarchies, can be traced to two key articles. Meyer and Rowan’s [1977]
groundbreaking paper suggested that legitimacy may be a greater organizational force than economically predicted, particularly as an organizational field is structurated; and DiMaggio and Powell
[1983] wondered not why organizational forms vary but why they are so similar.
Emphasizing the manner in which organizations adopt structures, procedures or ideas not based
on efficiency but rather on external definitions of legitimacy [Meyer and Rowan 1977], recent reviews
of institutional theory [DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Scott 1995] distinguish between old and new streams of institutional theory. Old institutionalism emphasizes issues
of conflicting interests, coalitions and competing values, and power and influence at the community
level, while the new institutionalism is associated with legitimacy and the embeddedness of organizational fields, the centrality of classification and schema, and action oriented toward conformity,
isomorphism, and homogeneity.
While variants of institutional theory exist and there are conflicting positions as to whether or not
the end result is homogeneity or heterogeneity because similarities can be window dressing that hides
increased process variance [Donaldson 1995; Greenwood and Hinings 1996]; according to the new
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theory, organizations consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures,and activities that
provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Although constructed and maintained by individual
actors, institutions assume the guise of an impersonal and objective reality and operate at multiple
levels of jurisdiction with behaviors transported by various carriers—cultures, structures, and routines.
Rather than Weber’s [1952] belief that competition and the need for efficiency are the key drivers
of structural change in organizations, DiMaggio and Powell posit that an organization’s iterative and
ongoing relationships with other organizations, the quest for legitimacy, and the process of structuration makes them more similar but not necessarily more efficient [Donaldson 1995]. Over time,
in a structured field, organizations constrain themselves by their choices in that practices can become
infused with value beyond the technical requirements at hand and strategies that are rational for
individual organizations may not be rational if adopted by large numbers. Similarity increases rather
than decreases as an organizational field emerges.
Building upon Hawley’s [1968] definition of isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions,”
DiMaggio and Powell identified two forms of isomorphism: competitive and institutional.
Competitive isomorphism relates to population ecology models and operates at the level of
selection. Homogeneity, or the reduction in variation, results as nonoptimal forms are selected out
of a population to improve survivability or because organizational decision makers learn appropriate
responses and adjust their behavior accordingly (Lamarckian evolution) [Baum 1996; Hannan and
Freeman 1984].
Institutional isomorphism, on the other hand, reflects forces such as those of competitors and
other organizations and occurs later in the life of an organizational field as it becomes structured.
Three mechanisms or processes that lead to this outcome are:
•

Coercive isomorphism, which stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy. This
results from both formal and information pressures exerted upon an organization by other
organizations upon which they are dependant and may be felt as force, persuasion, or invitations
to collusion but can also result from the need to fit in with entrenched standards [DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; Donaldson 1995].

•

Mimetic isomorphism results from standardized responses to uncertainty and refers to the
imitation of one organization seen by another as more legitimate or successful [DiMaggio and
Powell 1983]. Under mimetic isomorphism, causality is shifted from technical efficiency toward
ideology [Donaldson 1995] and although conformity results and imitation is encouraged,
innovation may result from imperfect copying and adaptation and is often facilitated by consulting
companies [Greve and Taylor 2000].

•

Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalism, the “collective struggle of members
of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the ‘production of
producers’ and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy”
[DiMaggio and Powell 1983]. Related to education that homogenizes the administration, it has
two sources:
— formal education and of legitimation in a cognitive base of university specialists
— elaboration and growth of organizationally spanning professional networks where diffusion
occurs and a pool of fungible individuals is created that possess a socially derived similar
disposition and orientation
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Although each of these mechanisms is related, difficult to isolate, and difficult to analytically define
and measure [Mizruchi and Fein 1999], DiMaggio and Powell considered them orthogonal and arising
from differing causes. While they have not, to our knowledge, been previously explored in a technological setting, mimetic adoption has been studied from an economic perspective [Levin et al. 1987;
Mansfield 1961], and Fligstein [1991] has applied mimetic isomorphism to mergers and acquisitions
and identified that imitating others has been practiced in many industries with banking and other
regulated and technology intensive industries found to have a particularly high level of isomorphism
[Deephouse 1996].

UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE
The managerial reduction of uncertainty, the lack of knowledge as to a decision or event outcome, is well rooted in decision models [Abrahmson 1991; March and Olsen 1976], is related to
ambiguity, and historically has been considered a major criterion for management action [Cyert and
March 1963]. Applied to technology, it refers to the degree to which it is difficult for an organization
to determine the reliability, capacity, and precision of a new technology, and whether a newer technology will soon appear to make it obsolete [Gerwin 1988].
First appearing in the work of Cyert and March [1963], uncertainty avoidance has been defined
as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations
and readily applies to technology selection [Hofstede 1991]. Rogers [1995], for example, notes that
computer and technology related innovations have particular difficulties because the level of uncertainty with non-incremental or quantum changes create the most disruption.
From a practical perspective, when faced with the technological uncertainty of selecting between
competing technologies, firms have a number of possible strategies. The first, to wait until they
believe that more information will be available or that the better decision will be more clearly visible,
is by definition not a strategy that can be followed by a firm that has to make an early adoption
decision. Similarly, the more active option of gathering more information under the belief that it will
reduce decision ambiguity is premised on the unproven notion that more information ameliorates the
decision process [Ackoff 1967] and is a rational efficiency theory, which assumes that organizations
chose to adopt an innovation that is diffusing based on updated information about its technical
efficiency or returns [Abrahmson and Rosenkopf 1993]. Other implementation-oriented strategies
are hedging one’s position by implementing both technologies concurrently until the superior choice
is visible or deciding between the choices based upon the information available. Hedging, which can
be an effective strategy to mitigate the risk for many firms, has the disadvantage of potentially
duplicating the effort and resources required. Hedging might not be available to smaller firms that
are resource constrained and can result in complex configurations as a result of supporting technical
incompatibilities. Although the strategy chosen by a firm will be contingent on a number of factors
such as competitive pressure, available resources, technological characteristics, managerial
preferences, and corporate strategy, in this research we focus on the last option where managers are
not able to defer decisions and select a single choice between competing options because this poses
the greatest amount of uncertainty for early adopters. Decisions made by early adopters have supranormal influence in that their choices can result in path dependence [Arthur 1987] or they may act as
an information source for later adopters [Abrahmson and Rosenkopf 1993].
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III. HYPOTHESES AND PROPOSITIONS
HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL
This research extends the economic study of mimetic adoption [Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield 1961]
to technology by investigating the effect of external subjective and social norms on the technology
evaluation process of early adopters. We propose that selection between similar but incompatible
emergent technologies is a nondeterministic and highly ambiguous process characterized by high
uncertainty [Arthur 1987]. Under these conditions, we propose that institutional factors will reduce
the saliency of traditional product evaluation and overcome otherwise rational decision making.
Specifically, we posit that firms will exhibit isomorphism, stemming from the desire to reduce
uncertainty, by copying the decisions made by others even if they are believed to be inferior or
suboptimal.
While acknowledging that each of the forms of isomorphism are intertwined and separation may
be somewhat analytic, we consider that each of the three definitions arise and are present at different
times during a particular technological life cycle. Considering the technology adoption curve [Rogers
1995], we posit that when competing fungible but incompatible technologies are first introduced (e.g.,
Cisco and WellFleet router technology circa 1989), the high level of selection uncertainty results in
mimetic isomorphism as firms copy others to reduce their uncertainty. Over time, as the technology
diffuses, and a particular standard becomes entrenched, coercive isomorphism becomes more
salient and mimetic less so as early adopters exert pressure upon dependant others to comply with
their choices. Finally, as supporting organizations such as training and education centers emerge
and professionals move within the tiers of successively later adopters, mimetic isomorphism is further
reduced and coercive is subsumed into normative isomorphism. In this structure, isomorphism is a
second order construct but each of the formative sub-constructs has a different temporal primacy.
Our conceptual model suggests that selection of an inferior product following a traditional product
evaluation occurs as a result of the degree of referent influence and that the level of innovation is
negatively correlated to the level of uncertainty avoidance. Firms that are early adopters of technology must make decisions characterized with ambiguity.
For early adopters under conditions of high uncertainty and when selecting between competing
technological choices with no referent influences, we propose that decision makers will make selection decisions that are consistent with traditional multidimensional product evaluations. When
presented with competing selections, they will choose the one that is believed to be superior as
indicted by the highest score in a qualitative and quantitative analysis. However, in the presence of
a potential referent to mimic and when a decision maker is aware that the referent has selected a
technology that is considered to be inferior, it will result in the reduced saliency of the traditional
technological product evaluation, an increase in mimetic isomorphism, and the product that has not
received the highest qualitative and quantitative score from the product evaluation will be selected.
We propose three constructs:
•

Level of Innovation. This is a measure of the overall level of innovation or propensity to adopt a
new and unproven technology present in the firm, and an antecedent to the level of mimetic
isomorphism. Level of innovation has a negative correlation with uncertainty avoidance.
Therefore, the more innovative a firm, the less it will exhibit mimetic isomorphism. Conversely,
the less innovative a firm, the more it will exhibit mimetic isomorphism.
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model
•

Uncertainty Avoidance. This is the extent to which a firm feels threatened by the uncertain or
unknown consequences of selecting a particular technology. This antecedent has a positive
correlation to mimetic isomorphism: the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance, the higher the
level of mimetic isomorphism.

•

Mimetic Isomorphism. The degree to which the early adopter selection decisions a firm makes
resemble those of other firms as a response to the uncertainty of competing choices.
The relationship between these propositions and constructs is shown in Figure 1.

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH MODEL
Our hypotheses and research model simplify our conceptual model to validate our general theory.
We test three hypotheses related to referent quality and the presence of mimetic isomorphism and
rely on subsequent research and scale development to address the relationship between innovation
and uncertainty avoidance.
Stated formally, the hypotheses are:
H1:

In the absence of a referent group to mimic, decision makers will select the product
that receives the highest score in a traditional product evaluation process.

H2:

The presence of a referent that has selected the inferior product will reduce the
saliency of scores from a traditional product evaluation and result in selection of the
inferior product.

H3:

The selection of a product that receives a lower evaluation will be positively correlated to the level and quality of an endorsement to that product by a referent.

Mimetic Isomorphism & Technology Evaluation
by P. Tingling & M. Parent

Journal of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 3, 2002) 113-143

122

IV. RESEARCH METHOD
METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
Because the objective of this research was to determine the effect of normative influence in earlystage technology selection, a process that can have idiosyncratic elements and is difficult to observe
and measure in field research, we conducted an experiment [Behling 1980; Bikhchandani et al. 1998;
Weick 1965] where respondents were advised that we were conducting a survey of evaluation criteria
and a Web-based case study evaluation delivered over the Internet.
Based upon the in-depth input of two practitioners and two academics not associated with the
research, respondents were presented with a series of criteria frequently cited in technical evaluations
and asked to indicate on a Likert-type scale the relative importance they gave to each item when
choosing between technologies (this aspect of the research was used mainly as context for the
experimental treatment by raising the saliency of these criteria and are listed in Appendix A).
After completing this section and a validated measure of their general level of innovation
[Parasuraman 2000], respondents were presented with a hypothetical comparison of two products,
“spq” and “xyz,” and asked to consider that the comparison had been completed by their own
organizations. This evaluation was based upon the previously described criteria and consisted of a
summary rating where one product received a rating of 156 out of a possible 225 while the other
received a rating of 161. Although very similar to each other and summarized rather than individually
detailed, this format was selected after consultation with both academics and practitioners because
we considered that decision makers would otherwise adjust the weighting factors based upon their
own preferences and confound or compromise the purpose of the research. In that the intent was
to consider decision choices under uncertainty, it was important that the two choices be substantially
similar. Aside from the fact that it is often easier to select between two products that are quite
different, the choices were proposed as essentially fungible or interchangeable yet incompatible.
Based upon this, the evaluations were set as being within a few points of each other: within the
margin of evaluation error but consistent with the objectives of experiment and considered
representative by our pilot practitioners. A large margin could signal our experimental objective while
a small difference would be more indicative of increased competition [Baum and Haverman 1997;
Hannan and Freeman 1977] and consistent with our presentation: if we argue that the choice is
between similar products, it follows that the products would have similar total evaluations.
This experiment required respondents to chose between two emergent competing technologies
with the implication that only one would ultimately prevail (suggested through the use of VHS and
Beta as a research metaphor in the survey solicitation). We reasoned that normative isomorphism
would not be present in that the case study excluded supporting professional or administrative
structures for either of the competing choices. Coercive isomorphism could be similarly discounted
because the technological choice was characterized as emergent with no standards yet established
and the technologies had been described as incompatible. As such, endorsement statements
stimulating mimetic isomorphism by identifying the adoption of the lower rated technology by a
referent could be added to the case study. As a result, one of three statements that consisted of
varying levels of endorsement were dynamically added to the evaluation and decision text and took
one of the following forms:
0

[Control Group] No treatment.
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1

[Low] At a trade show, you were recently informed that a competitor has selected [the lower
scored technology].

2

[Moderate] At a trade show, you were recently informed that a high performing competitor
has selected [the lower scored technology].

3

[Reverse] At a trade show you were recently informed that a competitor selected the alternative and rejected [the higher performing technology]. (Because there are only two
selections this statement is essentially identical to the low treatment but was framed as a
negative endorsement by the earlier social psychology work of Kahneman and Tversky
[1973, 1979], which found that the way a statement was coded can have significant effects
upon how the question is answered.)

Data were collected during June and July, 2001, from a custom-built Website based upon active
server pages, server-side Java, and tables driven by a Microsoft Access database. Hosted in a
commercial ISP environment because of its higher availability, redundancy and load-sharing configuration, the site required 12 days of design effort from the primary researcher, approximately 200
hours of professional analysis and coding, 25 hours of database administration, 10 hours of graphic
art and branding, and 20 hours of project management.
All pages in the Website had a consistent look and feel with brand graphics and colors provided
by the researchers’ university (sample screen images are included as Appendix B). With the
exception of the demographic page, none of the screens required scrolling on a full-sized window.
The Website had seven logical stages or sections.
1. Home page. A URL, www.TechnologySelectionResearch.org, was selected to provide a
relevant and easy to remember location rather than one that had multiple extensions or that was
prone to typographic errors (e.g., www…..ca/survey/selection).
2. Consent. This page, displayed after the respondent logged in, detailed the ethical policy of the
researchers’ university, the commitment to confidentiality and privacy, the planned usage of the
data, and noted that respondents could decline to answer any question or have their responses
deleted even after completion. Acceptance of this policy was required in order to proceed. Using
Java, this screen also assigned a consecutive numeric treatment identifier between one and eight
that was used by the Website to assign the treatment (stage 5).
3. Research Description. This page provided respondents with a sense of survey length and progress by describing the main sections of (1) survey questions, (2) case study, where they would
be requested to place themselves in the role of decision maker (this section contained the experimental treatment), and (3) demographic questions.
4. Questionnaire. Respondents completed survey questions using radio buttons on Likert-type
scales. Responses were forced in that all questions had to be answered before proceeding to
the next page, although a decline to state option for each question was included.
5. Treatment. Based upon the sequential random number assigned during login, respondents were
presented with one of four scenarios that contained modified text which had been inserted during
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page generation and asked to make a selection between the choices. The choices were
randomly assigned to the right and left side of the screen to obviate position bias and the options
themselves were replicated and the names of the choices reversed to obviate name or selection
bias (resulting in eight groups).
6. Demographics. This section contained approximately 20 questions such as age, gender,
experience, and industry.
7. Acknowledgement.
In addition to dynamic page creation, positioning of responses, and generation of treatments
within the Website, we also captured technical information on the respondents’ browser type and
version. This allowed checking for respondent bias against the total Internet population by a
comparison of the sample to published browser market share data and was compared to the
information stated by the respondents (at the time of the collection, Netscape Navigator accounted
for approximately 11 percent of our sample, a figure comparable with published estimates).
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION
The sampling frame consisted of a subset of the mailing list of a national Canadian information
technology magazine aimed at executives, a sample well suited to the medium [Bauman and Airey
2000]. Following pretesting of the Website by 22 part-time MBA students, whose involvement was
limited to systems testing and not included in the analysis, and initial design assistance with industry
experts, recipients were randomly selected from the mailing list. A total of 3,426 personalized but
otherwise identical solicitations [Babbie 1990] were sent. The solicitations included 448 two-page
letters on university letterhead and 2,978 e-mails. The solicitations, containing a description of the
study, privacy policy, and personalized credentials, were sent in two phases, the first 200 letters and
200 e-mails in July of 2001, and the remainder (248 letters and 2,778 e-mails), 14 days later. A single
e-mail reminder was sent to all non-respondents 44 days after their initial solicitation. Respondents
were asked to complete the survey within a week of receiving the solicitation; data were collected for
50 days in total, a deadline imposed by our research agenda. Four respondents that did not indicate
that they had a role or responsibility for technology acquisition completed the survey and instrument
but were excluded from analysis. A total of 348 usable responses were received and tested for
solicitation medium, timing, and naming, biases, none of which were detected. Aggregate response
rate was 10.15 percent (46 letter responses [10.26%] and 302 e-mail responses [10.14%]). Research
on Web survey response rates is somewhat equivocal with some research suggesting increased
response from improved design, better targeting of desired respondents, and identification of
interested or affected parties [Swoboda et al. 1997; Yun and Trumbo 2000], while other research
indicates that higher response results are a novelty and will ultimately decline [Klassen and Jacobs
2001] or that Web surveys inherently have lower response rates [Yun and Trumbo 2000]. Although
10.2 percent was relatively low by some standards, it needs to be considered in the context of the
audience, time-constrained senior information systems decision makers, the time-frame of the
solicitation (the research was conducted during the summer vacation period), the use of e-mail as the
primary communication medium (research has suggested that up to 12 percent of e-mail addresses
may be out of date even in lists believed to be current [Smith 1997]), the use of a single reminder, and
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the fact that no direct or fiscal compensation was provided to the respondents (although they did
receive summaries of the evaluation results).
The demographics of the sample were compared to those of the magazine and found to be
similar with no over-weighting along any dimension. The sample is described in Table 1, Respondent
Position, Table 2, Respondent Industry, and Table 3, Respondent Gender and Tenure.
Table 1. Respondent Position
Position

%

Number

VP/Director – MIS

48.2

168

VP/Director – Business Unit

18.4

64

CIO

9.2

32

CEO

8.3

29

CFO

1.1

4

Other

14.6

51

Total

99.8 (due to rounding)

348

Table 2. Respondent Industry
Industry

%

Number

Government

13.5

47

Consulting

10.9

38

Computing

8.9

31

Manufacturing

8.6

30

Telecommunications

5.5

19

Education

4.9

17

Insurance

4.0

14

Banking

3.7

13

Transportation

3.2

11

Other

36.7

128

Total

99.9 (due to rounding)

348
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Table 3. Respondent Gender and Tenure
%

Number

Male

85.9

299

Female

14.1

49

Total

100

348

Less than 1 year

9.5

33

2-4 Years

29.9

104

5-7 Years

13.5

47

8-10 Years

7.5

26

10 + Years

39.3

137

Decline to State

0.3

1

Total

100

348

Gender

Tenure

V. RESULTS
Data from the experiment were coded as either 1, where the respondent selected the technology
that received the higher scored evaluation (i.e., the expected selection based upon individual rational
choice arguments), or 0, where the technology that received the lower scored evaluation was selected
by the respondent. Because the decision choice was dichotomous, Chi-square tests were used in
the analysis.
Initial output from the experiment consisted of two sets of four treatments that were mirror images
of each other (“spq versus xyz” and “xyz versus spq”) for each of the treatments. Statistical tests
were run to verify that no naming bias existed prior to aggregating these groups into the four
treatments (p > .901, Pearson Chi-square = .015, df = 1, n = 348). Once aggregated, similar SPSS
tests were executed to verify the absence of media solicitation bias in the letters and e-mails (p >.361,
Pearson Chi-square = .835, df = 1, n = 348) and nonresponse bias using late responses [Armstrong
and Overton 1977]. None were found. (p > .804, Pearson Chi-square = .062, df = 1, n = 348).
After aggregation, the groups were labeled as 0 or control to indicate the absence of an influence
statement, 1 or unspecified competitor to indicate the lower form of the referent statement (“at a trade
show you were recently informed that a competitor had selected the [lower scored] product”), 2 or
high performing competitor to indicate the higher form of referent statement (“at a trade show you
were recently informed that a high performing competitor had selected the [lower scored] product”),
and 3 or reverse/negative, a statement equal to the low treatment but negatively framed. These
treatments are listed in Appendix C and the results are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4. Effect of Competitor Adoption-Endorsement Statement

Low-Choice
Score

%

HighChoice
Score

%

N

Significance
(Pearson Chisquare)

Hypotheses

Groups

1

0
No Endorsement

8

9.2

79

90.8

87

19.361***

2,3

1
Unspecified
Competitor

25

27.9

68

73.1

93

9.391**

2,3

2
High Performing
Competitor

36

37.1

61

62.9

97

19.647***

2,3

3
Reverse/Negative
Endorsement

18

25.4

53

74.6

71

7.423**

Total

87

261

348

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 .

The first hypothesis was supported. In the absence of a referent group to mimic, decision makers
selected the higher-rated technology 90.8 percent of the time. While eight respondents (9.2 percent),
counter to rational expectation theory, selected the lower rated technology, this is believed to result
from a combination of experimental noise and pursuit of a differentiation strategy. Postexperimental
discussions with individuals that selected the lower technology indicated a desire to “root for the
underdog since the differences were not that great” and, consistent with differentiation and
contingency strategies [Baum and Haverman 1997; Hotelling 1929; Miller and Chen 1996; Porter
1980], a purposeful desire to chose against the mainstream in pursuit of competitive advantage, that
is, a respondent indicated that their firm believed that “competitive advantage could only come from
either superior execution of a common strategy or differentiation.”
The second and third hypotheses were also supported. The group that received the low
endorsement selected the higher evaluated technology 73.1 percent of the time, declining to 62.9
percent of the time in the presence of moderate endorsement, increasing to 74.6 percent of the time
in the presence of a reverse endorsement.
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results from this experiment, although consistent with earlier reports that the actions or
endorsements of one set of economic decision makers often influence the reaction and purchase of
others [Bikhchandani et al. 1998] extend existing research in a number of key areas.
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Because the experiment provided managers with product evaluation information in an environment of decision uncertainty, our research focuses on mimetic isomorphism and suggests that this
is not solely a low-cost heuristic used by managers in place of their decision-making processes
[March and Olsen 1976; Staw and Epstein 2000], but can interact with and transcend what might
otherwise appear to be independent rational choices. In our experiment, despite limited indication
of the veracity of the referent statements, decision makers mimicked the choice of another firm even
though these selections were contrary to extensive evaluations conducted by their own staff that
showed these selections to be inferior.
There are a number of possible explanations for these results. The first is that the output of
product evaluations, although intended by practitioners to provide an unequivocal indication of a
superior product or to surface important information about a product under consideration, could
instead be ornamental or ritualistic, aimed at signaling decision-making rigor, or a delaying tactic.
An alternative explanation is that decision makers, recognizing that many technologies benefit
from increasing returns and network effects, consider selection as a game of mutual dependence and
alter their opinions not on the basis of their own completed evaluation but on the basis of what they
expect other, less well-informed, rational actors to do. In this scenario, decision makers might recognize that even though they have conducted an evaluation and do not copy other firms, as a low-cost
decision heuristic, others will and this could result in widespread adoption of the inferior choice as the
error prone choices of a few early individuals create path dependence [Arthur 1996; Beggs 1989;
Bikhchandani et al. 1998]. On this basis, the decision maker would choose the inferior technology
in order to not waste their vote [Granovetter 1978] or in the belief that the inferior choice will be the
inevitable herd selection. This is consistent with population ecology theories [Astley and Fombrun
1983; Hannan and Freeman 1984], where it has been posited that when managerial decisions are
viewed as individually impotent, collective action may instead be taken, but differs from traditional
game theory models, which assume that actors make their decisions simultaneously and that no
one’s decision is contingent on the previous decision of anyone else [Granovetter 1978; Luce and
Raiffa 1957]).
These explanations, and the mimetic influence of copying other firms, are not mutually exclusive
and, like the three processes of isomorphism, are intertwined and difficult to separate. In this paper,
our objective was to raise the saliency of subjective norms in the technology selection process and
to illustrate how an organization might interact with the presence of a conflicting decision made by a
peer. However, this is a complex and iterative process that is affected by prior action within the firm
and the expected future action of the actors. Of particular significance, for example, is the ongoing
interaction between the analyst and the decision maker, and the organizational norms where the
decision was counter to that expected by the analyst. Where this has occurred, it is reasonable to
expect that the future evaluation process and outcome will be modified to address expected
dissonance.
This research is consistent with fashion and fad literature [Abrahmson 1991, 1996; Abrahmson
and Fairchild 1999] but differs in two areas. First, it differs in terms of orientation. Rather than an
antecedent adoption position caused by external influences, our research focuses on the choice and
selection process following the decision to adopt from a variety of competing but incompatible options.
Second, and more importantly, while the fashion and fad literature suggests that pressures may drive
technically inefficient adoption in later stages of diffusion and early stages are driven more by rational
choice, our findings indicate that early stage technologies may be more susceptible to strategies that
appear nonrational and that the decision process is inherently nonindividual.
There are both research and practitioner implications from this research. For researchers, the
findings suggest that in addition to known internal subjective norms of peer, subordinate, and
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manager influences, external and institutional forces have significance in the selection and adoption
of technology and that adoption models could be improved if explicit consideration were given to
these influences.
This is an important area of research in that many technologies benefit from network effects and
increasing returns and in exchange for the high risk and ambiguity of technological selection the
decision process of early adopters can create path dependence and stifle innovation by creating
positive feedback loops and animate cycles where the number of adopters create stronger pressures
to adopt [Abrahmson and Fairchild 1999; Abrahmson and Rosenkopf 1993; Mansfield 1961].
Because of their key position as gatekeepers of technology selection, further research should focus
on these firms.
This research also has implications for practitioners. While we do not necessarily advocate this
position, for manufacturers, it suggests that product placement at a prestige account becomes
paramount when their technology is perceived as inferior—a testament to the widely held principle
of technology evangelism [Davidow 1986; Kawasaki 1990].
On the reverse side, firms that are evaluating competing technologies and are subsequently
advised that competitors have selected a particular product would be well advised to investigate the
evaluation process undertaken by reference firms before choosing to ignore their own due diligence.
Under certain conditions, it is likely that some manufacturing or supplying firms might make the
economic decision that the marginal utility of an endorsement statement from a prestigious or premier
firm has increased or faster utility than product improvements. A similar caution and concern is the
apparent implication that so many managers were willing to make a decision inconsistent with the
results of their own staff’s extensive evaluations after a relatively weak and unverified endorsement.
This is troubling in terms of the authenticity and validity of evaluations and the degree of confidence
that is invested in the judgment of their staff. Firms performing evaluations should carefully consider
the implications of selecting a technology that was not recommended by their evaluation committees
and the weight that will or should be given to reference accounts. While it may be convenient to
dismiss this as an experimental aberration, discussion with one respondent indicated that this is not
an unusual practice.
Suppliers of technology should also note that the use of negative endorsements in a two-choice
model led to increased selection at a significant level but were not as successful as either a weak or
moderately positive endorsement from a stronger referent. As a result, they might wish to consider
the consequences of negative messages in their communication campaigns.
IX. LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations in the execution of these findings. The first is in the operationalization and isolation of mimetic isomorphism, a construct that is complex and not monolithic
[DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Mizruchi and Fein 1999]. Because of this difficulty, we designed an
experiment to minimize and isolate confounding effects and also to highlight the main focus of
mimetic rather than coercive or normative isomorphism, the uncertainty surrounding new technology
decisions [Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield 1961].
The second is the internal and external validity issues that are invariably present with trade-offs
between field-work and experiments. Based upon our research objective, we believed that an
experiment would be the most appropriate method of developing and testing our theory [Behling 1980;
Weick 1965], selected the sample frame to provide adequate representation of the desired population
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(i.e., information technology decision makers and executives), and designed the (disguised)
experiment with the assistance of practitioners.
A third exposure is that the treatment was obvious or that respondents surmised the research
objective. This was addressed by the use of disguise in the purpose of the research, a Website
design that prevented deep-linking or skipping ahead, and embedding the treatments within the
overall evaluation statements rather than giving them undue emphasis. While we did not conduct
random interviews with the respondents, we received approximately 75 unsolicited respondent emails or telephone messages. None mentioned the presence of the endorsement statements. We
have had extensive follow-up conversations with nine respondents and none identified the
endorsement statement as a key message in the description of the evaluation, yet all commented on
the validity and difficulty of the selection with one respondent noting “I can tell that you used to be in
IT; this is typical: there is not enough information to make an informed decision.”
Finally, the sample may not be representative of the broader population, and is exacerbated by
the high nonresponse rate. Specifically, particular groups, such as technology laggards, who are
likely to copy other firms, could be overrepresented and others underrepresented. However, the main
purpose of the research was not generalizability, but theory development and validation. Analysis
of the respondent industries and firm size did not indicate concentration in a single area. In addition,
unknown and transparent to the respondents, we detected their browser configuration during
completion of the survey and compared the version and manufacturer frequency with that reported
in the popular press. No one browser or version used to access our Website was overrepresented.
While the response rate is lower than what is reported for many experiments, nonresponse bias was
tested using the process outlined by Armstrong and Overton [1977]. The sample has high external
validity and may more reflect time constraints and the attention deficit behavior of the respondents
coupled with the timing of the data collection (during the summer) rather than systemic bias.
X. FUTURE RESEARCH
This research suggests that external references and subjective norms may be a large influence
factor for the selection and adoption of technology. These decisions may be more complex than
originally conceptualized. They may be made in consideration of the actions of other actors and may
not be individually rational in the traditional sense. Future research to extend and confirm these
experimental findings coupled with scale development to measure the constructs used in this
experiment would assist with theory development and practice.
Scale development to measure innovation has typically focused on the adoption of particular
technologies, although more recently the technology readiness index (TRI) [Parasuraman 2000] has
been developed to measure innovation at the firm level. Similarly, although several measures exist
for uncertainty avoidance, we were only able to find one measure that had been tested for technology
avoidance and that was in a retail purchase environment [Achrol and Stern 1988]. No scales were
found for isomorphism despite an extensive computerized search and a request posted to the
ISWorld listserv that drew 12 responses. Because organizations have been shown to differ in that
some are conformist and compete in conventional ways acting much like their competitors, while
others are iconoclasts and adopt competitive practices that deviate from industry norms [Miller and
Chen 1996], a measure of isomorphic tendency coupled with measurement of the regulatory level of
the firm would allow greater research and allow testing of Deephouse’s [1996] proposition that highly
regulated industries are more likely to conform.
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A second and larger extension of the research would include further experimentation that
manipulates multiple independent variables such as the evaluation criteria and the level of the
treatment, while controlling for relative innovativeness of the adopting firm and their industry. While
it is somewhat axiomatic that once a technology or standard is entrenched, improvements or changes
are difficult because of switching costs and other externalities (e.g., QWERTY [David 1985; Garud
and Kumaraswamy 1993]), in the early stages of adoption, it would seem intuitive that there is a lower
limit or minimum quality and feature level that is required to gain adoption. The development of
sensitivity models would provide insight into the determination of the relative trade-offs that firms
make in their technology selection. Further research could also control for the reputation of the
evaluating firm to test if the alternative game-theory hypothesis discussed earlier is valid in that one
would expect that higher reputation firms would be less likely to copy others once they have
completed their evaluation but would be more likely to undertake signaling behavior [Spence 1974].
A third area of future research might focus on how evaluations are conducted and how relative
weights and values are assigned to each of the criteria either consciously or subconsciously. For
example, while it is intuitive to expect that highly isomorphic firms place greater weight on market
share or adoption criteria, all else being equal, do they subconsciously provide higher evaluations in
unrelated criteria to products that they are aware have been adopted by leading firms?
Finally, we note that many technological choices are embedded within and constrained by prior
existing choices: the past casts a long shadow on the present and managers do not have
unconstrained ability to effect change [Lawrence 1999]. However, while a large proportion of
technological choices may be path dependant and a firm that has made one set of choices may not
be able to mimic another that has made different ones, occasionally discontinuities and other
technological changes result in the presence of strategic windows of managerial or other intervention
and these present opportunities for change [Ciborra and Hanseth 1998]. Further research into how
mimetic behavior can either be encouraged for superior upstart technologies or discouraged by
inferior entrenched incumbents will have broad policy implications for both suppliers and purchasers
and government support of innovation and regulation.
Robey and Boudreau [1999], reviewing the inconsistencies of prior information systems research,
have suggested that rather than a matter of flawed methods, perhaps the contradictions are inherent
in the phenomena under consideration. To address this, they suggest the application of different
theories that incorporate a logic of opposition and opportunities for diametrically opposed forces
rather than the historic orientation of technology as deterministic. By applying institutional theory to
technology evaluation and adoption, we take up their challenge and improve our understanding of this
phenomenon. Technology selection has been a persistent and puzzling problem for information
systems researchers. While adoption theories have gone a long way toward explaining the dynamics
of individual choice, they fall short when considering these decisions in the context of a firm, with all
of its competitive imperatives.
Institutional theory has been advanced as one possible approach to understanding organizational
behavior in its total context. In the case of technology selection, institutional theory might allow
researchers to derive meaningful insight. This research, and its use and introduction of mimetic
isomorphism to the problem of technology selection, begins to address these needs.
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APPENDIX A : EVALUATION CRITERIA
These factors were pretested with field interviews with two IS executives from different firms.
Responses were indicated on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored with very important (1) and very
unimportant (5).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Immediate acquisition cost
Three-year cost of ownership
Long-term (4 to 7 years) cost structure
Location of the firms head office or offices
Documentation and education
Technical support
Market share
Financial strength of the firm
Number and reputation of the firm partners
Architecture and degree to which product is open or extensible
Existing clients—names of existing clients
Existing clients—the industry of existing clients
Capabilities—features available in the existing product
Capabilities—features that the vendor advises are under development and may be
available in the next release (under development)
Ease of use—how easy it is to use or to install or configure the product
Other important criteria—please specify
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APPENDIX B. WEBSITE IMAGES
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APPENDIX C. TREATMENT STATEMENTS
The treatments were created dynamically with active server pages. The following text was included
on the selection page.
Your firm or organization will be implementing a strategic business-based solution
that requires a “plug-in” [Plug is was a “hover over” that provided a lay explanation
of the product] to the Internet browser that your company uses. Your organization
has performed an extensive and thorough evaluation of two different products
described below. One has to be selected in order to maintain the project schedule.
This project has the full support of your top executive team and is a key element of
your firm’s competitive position and strategy.
Both of the products that they have evaluated have slightly different features with
each one having most of the specific capabilities that you need. Neither meets all
of your requirements, although both have separately indicated that the features that
you need will be delivered in the next release.
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Each of the products was evaluated against each of these criteria and the scores in
each category multiplied by the weighting. These scores were then summed and the
totals were within five points of each other. [Treatment text was inserted here]
The products were evaluated on the following criteria: [the criteria from Appendix A
were listed as a series of “hover- over” links that provided an explanation of the
item.] The total scores were displayed
Please choose the plug-in that you would recommend your organization purchase.
[Radio buttons for the selections were provided]
The statements were dynamically embedded and took the following form:
0

No treatment [Control Group].

1

[Low] At a trade show, you were recently informed that a competitor has
selected [the lower scored technology].

2

[Moderate] At a trade show, you were recently informed that a high performing
competitor has selected [the lower scored technology].

3

[Reverse] At a trade show, you were recently informed that a competitor
selected the alternative and rejected [the higher performing technology].
[Because there are only two selections, this statement is essentially identical to
the low treatment but was framed as a negative endorsement.]
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